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Henry Johnstone's  
Theory of Philosophical Argumentation: 
Argum entum  ad hominem  
and New Methods  
of Philosophical Polemics
At the beginning, let me introduce M r Henry Webb Johnstone, 
Jr. He was born on 22 February 1920 in Montclair, and died on 
18 February 2000.
A distinguished philosopher, Henry Webb was teaching for four 
years at Williams College. Then, between 1952 and 1984, he taught in 
the department of philosophy at Penn State University.
He was the author of eight books (for example: Philosophy, Rhe­
toric, and Argumentation', What is Philosophy?; The Problem o f the 
Self, Validity and Rhetoric in Philosophical Argument) and more 
than 160 articles on philosophy, logic, argumentation theory, rheto­
ric and classics. Henry Johnstone founded and for 22 years was 
editing the journal, Philosophy and Rhetoric. While at Penn State, he 
also served as the acting department chair, director of the Institute 
for the Arts and Humanistic Studies, and the assistant of the vice- 
president for research. He held a Belgian-American Foundation 
Fellowship at the Free University of Brussels and — as a Fulbright 
Scholar — he was a visiting professor at Trinity College, Dublin; 
the University of Bonn, Germany; and the American University of 
Beirut.
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Henry Johnstone elaborated theory of philosophical argumen­
tation.1 He thought that all effective philosophical polemic is at root 
a valid type of argumentum ad hominem. Possibility of using this form 
of argumentation in philosophical speculation and deliberation as 
well as in philosophical debates and in the criticism of philosophical 
systems, is a feature which distinguishes philosophy from the empirical 
science on the one hand, and from logic, on the other.
In his article The Logical Powerfulness o f Philosophical Argument2 
Johnstone presents similar argumentation to Gilbert Ryle who points 
out that “philosophical arguments can be or fail to be logically 
powerfull in a sense of ‘logically’ closely related to the sense in which 
a proof may be or fail to be logically rigorous” .3 Ryle shows that phi­
losophical arguments are not proofs, for proofs require theorems 
and premises. But “there are no philosophical theorems” .4 Moreover, 
when the philosopher attempts to infer from the explicit premises, 
then “the debate instantly moves back a step. The philosophical point
1 See for example: H.W. J o h n s t o n e ,  Jr.: Philosophy and Argument, Pennsyl­
vania State University Press, 1959; Idem: Philosophy, Rhetoric, and Argumentation-, 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1965; Idem: “Philosophy and argumentum ad  
hominem", Journal o f Philosophy, 49 (1952); Ide m :  “The Methods of Philoso­
phical Polemic”, Methods, 5 (1953); Idem:  “The Nature of Philosophical Contro­
versy” , Journal o f Philosophy, 51 (1954); Idem:  “A  New Theory of Philosophical Ar­
gumentation”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 15 (1954); Idem:  “Some 
Aspects of Philosophical Disagreement”, Dialéctica, 8 (1954); Idem:  “The Logical 
Powerfulness of Philosophical Arguments”, Mind, 64 (1955); Idem: “New Outlooks 
on Controversy”, Review o f  Methaphysics, 12 (1958); Ide m :  “New Outlooks on Con­
troversy”, Review o f Methaphysics, 12 (1958); Idem:  “Truth, Communication and Per­
suasion in Philosophy”, Revue Internationale de Philosophic, 23 (1969); Idem:  “Bila­
terality in Argument and Communication”, in J.R. Cox, C.A. Willard (eds.): Advances 
in Argumentation Theory and Research, Southern Illinois Univ. Press, 1983; Idem:  
“Argumentation and Formal Logic in Philosophy”, Argumentation, 3 (1989); Idem:  
“Philosophical Argument and the Rhetorical Wedge”, Communication and Cognition, 
24 (1991).
2 See above.
3 G. R y le :  “Proofs in Philosophy”, Revue Internationale de Philosophie (1954), 
p. 151. See also Idem:  Philosophical Arguments. An Inaugural Lecture. Delivered before 
the University of Oxford, 30 October 1945, Oxford 1945.
4 Idem :  “Proofs” ..., p. 152.
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at issue is seen to be lodged [...] in those pretended premises them­
selves.”5
But it is important to notice that Johnstone clearly distinguishes 
argumentum ad personam from argumentum ad hominem. For philoso­
phical polemic is an appeal for purposes or principles whose endor­
sement, explicit or implicit, by philosopher under attack, is essential 
for his argumentation. Moreover, this valid argumentation should 
be distinguished from these uses of argumentum ad hominem, which 
have led to its customary condemnation as invalid. It is invalid when 
the defendant’s endorsement of the purposes or principles to which it 
appeals, would not be necessary.6
Let us see the glaring situation. If two men disagree over how 
many l’s there are in “philosophy” , or whether methyl alcohol has 
a higher boiling point than water, or whether there is a water vapour 
in the atmosphere of Venus, each can interpret the disagreement as 
consisting of the fact that the other has made a statement incom- 
patibile with the one he has made. Both can, without any difficulty, 
understand the statements in question. Moreover, both can, at least 
imagine what it would be like for his opponent’s statement to be 
true. The opposite statements are, thus, at least logically commensu­
rate.
When two men disagree over fundamental philosophical issues, 
however, neither is quite entitled to be able to imagine what it would 
be like for his opponent’s statement to be true, even though one or 
another may be under the illusion that he can. While stating their 
systematic positions, in effect they claim that these positions include 
all relevant evidence and therefore there are no statements adducing 
evidence against them, they are impossible.
For example, if one takes the position (apparently taken by exis­
tentialists) that authentic existence is more important than techno­
logical progress, one will not be able to think of technological progress 
as having any importance at all, except to the perhaps accidental 
extent that it enhances authentic existence; so it will be impossible,
5 Ibidem.
6 See H.W. J o h n s t o n e ,  Jr.: “The Methods...” .
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strictly speaking, even to imagine technological progress as more im­
portant than authentic existence. Therefore, Johnstone’s conclusion 
is that “the view is thus not logically commensurate with views that 
oppose it” .7
Next, he notices, that to a neutral observer of the issue, whether 
the authentic existence is more important than the technological 
progress, the logical incompatibility of the opposed statements at issue 
may, of course, seem to be obvious. This is because such an observer 
need not endorse a claim of either position to include all relevant 
evidence. Even a defendant of one of the positions involved, may, of 
course, at times, assume a role of a neutral observer. The existentia­
list can speculate about relative merits of existentialism and prag­
matism. But when he does, he is neglecting, for the moment, the fact 
that existentialism can be an actual philosophical position only when 
it claims that no other position is even possible.
So, the fact that philosophers argue need not be proved. Gene­
rally, however, they have not taken the official cognizance of their 
own argumentation. Philosophical views, as to the nature and func­
tion of philosophical controversy, have occurred only sporadically. 
But we can say that “theories of philosophical controversy, generally, 
tend either to doubt that argumentation results in a net gain in insight 
or to hope that it may” .8
For Johnstone, the doubtful theories are exemplified by Hume, 
K ant and Logical Positivism. Such positions are characterized by 
a polemical zeal that is incomprehensible and morally impossible 
unless it is genuinely motivated by the desire to promote new insights. 
“The philosophical argument” — concludes Johnstone — “to the 
effect that philosophical arguments make no contribution is surely 
itself intended as a contribution, and so, undercuts itself.”9
On the other hand, hopeful theories of philosophical controversy 
would be represented by the traditional views of the dialectic prior 
to Kant. Johnstone points out that “the common them, here, appears
7 H.W. J o h n s t o n e ,  Jr.: Philosophy and Argument..., p. 2.
8 I dem :  ‘T he Nature of Philosophical Controversy...” , p. 294.
9 Ibidem.
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to be the assumption that philosophical arguments can be resolved 
within a universe of discourse that each of opposing philosophies, and 
whose discovery enlarges human insight” .10 Therefore, what is over­
looked by such theories is the fact that philosophical antagonism 
may be so radical as to preclude any, but the most trivial reconcilia­
tion of this kind. The real rub, of course, is that the hopeful theories 
are themselves irrevocably opposed to the doubtful ones.
Let us notice that views of both types base their assessment of 
philosophical controversy on cognitive grounds, in the sense that they 
are both fundamentally concerned with the question of promoting 
insights. Thus, to avoid deadlock between them, it is reasonable to 
search for non-cognitive basis of the assessment. Moreover, it is 
very important to note that the assumption that the philosophical 
controversy must be evaluated on the non-cognitive grounds does 
not necessarily convince anyone to view that there is no connection 
between the arguments of philosophers and the enhancement of in­
sights. Such enhancement might be as well the result of controversy, if 
not the purpose of it.
Thus, philosophical opposition is not fundamentally logical. M o­
reover, it is more radical than any other pure, logical opposition 
holding between statements. Johnstone tries to show that the only 
proper response to disagreement, as radical as the one found with res­
pect to philosophical positions, is the participation in genuine con­
troversy.11 Consequently, not only is it impossible to cross the abyss 
that separates opposing philosophical positions unless the partisans 
of these positions are willing to argue with each other, but also the 
argumentation is the sole medium through which a position can com­
municate its content, even if, it faces no opposition. Thus, argument 
seems to be a fundamental philosophical method. Moreover, any phi­
losophical statement viewed apart from its argumentative context is
10 Ibidem, pp. 294—295. See also M. A d le r :  Dialectic, New York 1927 and 
J. P a s s m o r e :  Philosophical Reasoning, London 1969.
11 Compare: Ch. P e r e l m a n :  “A Reply to Henry W. Johnstone, Jr.”, in: M. N a- 
t a n s o n ,  H.W. J o h n s t o n e ,  Jr. (eds.): Philosophy, Rhetoric and Argumentation. The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1965, pp. 135— 137.
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profoundly ambiguous. No philosophical statement can be true, ex­
cept the one, relative to the argument through which it tends to be 
established. Respect of the relation between truth and argument is 
precisely what differs philosophy from science. The truth of scienti­
fic statement is not relative to the argument. But the truth of philo­
sophical statement is always relative to the argument. This apparent 
flouting of the Law of Contradiction may seem to be reaffirmation 
of a familiar bit of metaphysical nonsense. The Law of Contradic­
tion, however, applies only to propositions. Philosophical statements 
— claims Johnstone — are not propositions. The truth of philoso­
phical statement seems to be much more complicated matter than it is 
in the case of a proposition. Thus, we can say that no philosophical 
statement is absolutely true. “One important reason for supposing 
that the truth of such statements is relative to argument is that if 
no argument for or against the statement has been produced, it is 
impossible to decide what the statement means, and impossible, there­
fore, to think of it as true.”12
As I said, for Johnstone, in philosophy, there is nothing more 
authoritative in principle than the argument. There is, for instance, no 
philosophical way of advocating a philosophical doctrine except from 
producing arguments in its favour. And when arguments are brought 
to bear on a doctrine, if the proponents of the doctrine wish to con­
tinue to maintain it as a philosophical doctrine, they have no choice 
but to argue in its defense. Also, when it is shown that a philosophical 
doctrine rests upon a specious argument that is sufficient to discredit 
any philosophical claim the doctrine may make, even though the critic 
may admit the possibility of the doctrine’s being, none the less, true. 
Only the discovery of better argument can restore the philosophical 
credit of such a doctrine.
Of course, to say that in philosophy there is nothing more authori­
tative in principle than the argument does not mean the deny of the exi­
stence of philosophical grounds equally authoritative to the argument. 
Johnstone admits that there may exist, for example, philosophical 
data or insights with the same degree of authority. But, as he notices,
12 H.W. J o h n s t o n e ,  Jr.: Philosophy and Argument..., p. 25.
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“no statement merely reporting datum or insight is in itself philo­
sophical; it is rather psychological or autobiographical” .13 A state­
ment may be philosophical, but only when it appeals to datum or 
insight in the attempt to establish a conclusion of a certain type, or to 
refute the proposed philosophical thesis. This appeal would constitute 
an argument. So even if argument is not necessarily the only basis of 
authority in philosophy, it is, at least, an authoritative feature, com­
mon to all philosophical discourse.
Besides, Johnstone notices that controversy is one of the channels 
through which a person may seek power. And important feature of 
power that philosophical argumentation attempts to secure is that it 
is bilateral. It is power that can be posed only by granting it to others: 
it is clear that if I condemn your philosophy for violating the Law 
of Contradiction, or the Principle of Parsimony, I must be prepared to 
meet your charge that my view fails to satisfy the standards. Bilate­
ral power contrasts most of power, such as physical force, control 
through reward and punishment and persuasion through propaganda. 
On the other hand, in philosophical controversy, power of a given 
disputant is enhanced by his subjection to it, because that subjection 
serves to increase the number of critical principles available for their 
own use.14 As we can see, then, philosophical controversy is the quest 
for a kind of power that must be distinguished, on the one hand, from 
the unilateral use of physical, psychological or economic force, but on 
the other hand, also, from the bilateral criticism manifested in the 
empirical knowledge and logic. “The arguments of philosophers con­
cern positions which exclude each other but at the same time express 
totalities. The consistency of these requirements depends upon the 
possibility of criticism that is internal rather than merely external. And 
internal criticism is power, because it is ‘control over another insofar 
as he is in control of himself.”15
13 Ibidem, p. 21.
14 See H.W. J o h n s t o n e ,  Jr.: “The Nature...”, pp. 295—296. See also Idem:  
“A New Theory of Philosophical Argumentation...”, pp. 244— 252.
15 J o h n s t o n e :  “The Nature...”, p. 299. Author quotes here the phrase of 
Professor J.W. Miller o f Williams College.
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At this point Johnstone has to deal with a problem posed directly 
by his study. He inquires: can a philosophical argument actually 
succeed in supporting or attacking a philosophical statement? Is it 
possible, in other words, for such an argument to be valid? Obviously, 
not every argument serves to clarify the meaning of a given philoso­
phical statement or to cross a given philosophical abyss. The clarifi­
cation or transit can occur only if the argument is valid in some rele­
vant sense. In other words: how are valid philosophical arguments 
to be distinguished from persuasive ones? In the first place, in John­
stone’s opinion there is an obligation to accept the conclusion of 
a valid argumentation and, in the second place, whether this obli­
gation is, in fact, associated with any given philosophical argument, 
is altogether independent on the extent to which the argument is 
persuasive.
In his book, Philosophy and Argument,16 Henry Webb Johnstone 
attempts to ascertain the sense, in which philosophical arguments can 
be valid. It is important, because no philosophical statement is true or 
false except the one relative to the argument. The consequence is that 
a given statement might be relatively true to one argument and rela­
tively false to another. It may seem obvious that in this situation both 
arguments could be invalid. He shows that while argumentum ad homi- 
nem is not usually regarded as sufficient to establish any conclusion 
(indeed, it is usually simply dismissed as invalid), there are cases in 
which argumentum ad hominem, alone, suffices to establish a philoso­
phical conclusion. Furthemore, the abyss that separates conflicting 
philosophical systems precludes any use of argumentum ad rem\ for to 
appeal the evidence in attacking a position that claims to include all 
the evidence, is to pose the question. Thus, every valid philosophical 
argument is ad hominem.
In Johnstone’s opinion, there is no identity of validity together 
with formal validity in philosophy. And exactly, if validity is not to 
be equated with formal validity, this seems to open the door to the 
possibility of valid, philosophical arguments.
16 See especially Chapter V and VI: “The Validity of Philosophical Arguments”
I and II.
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Now, I would give an example of philosophical argument that 
Henry Johnstone regards as valid and whose validity cannot be ana­
lysed as an example of formal validity.17
One of the arguments used by Eudoxus in an attempt to show that 
pleasure is the chief good and that “any good thing — e.g., just or 
temperate conduct — is made more desirable by the addition of 
pleasure” .18 Aristotle, however, claimed that an argument of exactly 
the same type can be constructed to show that the chief good is not 
pleasure. For, as Plato had already argued, “the pleasant life is more 
desirable with wisdom than without” ,19 so wisdom would seem to be 
the chief good. Of course, this argumentation is not really isomorphic 
with that of Eudoxus, unless Aristotle intends to suggest that if 
wisdom be added to any good thing — not just to a pleasant life — 
the result is more desirable. Let us assume that this is what Aristotle 
did meant to suggest.
On this assumption, Aristotle’s criticism is devastating. If Eudoxus 
did actually used the argument ascribed to him by Aristotle, it is 
difficult to see how he could conscientiously continue to use it in the 
face of this criticism. There does not even seem to be any way, in 
which he could revise it to meet the criticism. Any appropriate revi­
sion would require some proviso to the effect that pleasure is not 
really rendered more desirable by the addition of any other good (for 
example, wisdom), even though, it might appear to be. But the inclu­
sion of such proviso would destroy the peculiar, argumentative force 
of Eudoxus’ argument, for the proviso itself would be tantamount to 
the simple statement that pleasure is the chief good, and the argument 
as a whole, could then be impugned as question-begging. In view of 
Aristotle’s attack, then, Eudoxus ought to have withdrawn his argu­
mentation.
There can be no question that Aristotle’s criticism of Eudoxus’ 
argument is relevant to what it attacks. It would be extravagant to
17 I quote from: H.W. J o h n s t o n e ,  Jr.: Philosophy and Argument..., pp. 64—65. 
Compare: G. R y le :  “Proofs...” .
18 See A r i s t o t l e :  Nicomachean Ethics, 1172b 24—26.
19 Ibidem, pp. 29—30.
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claim that Aristotle in any way misses the point of Eudoxus’ argu­
ment. Indeed, the very force of Aristotle’s criticism is just the result of 
the way in which that criticism makes use of the point of Eudoxus’ 
argument. No criticism can be forceful unless it is exactly relevant. Of 
course, a question-begging criticism would be exactly relevant but of 
minimum force. However, Aristotle’s criticism, far from begging the 
question, has maximum force. The origin of this force is seriousness of 
Eudoxus’ commitment to the principle of reasoning that he used in 
trying to prove that pleasure is the chief good. If he is serious, then he 
must be willing to maintain the above principle. But if he maintains it, 
then Aristotle can overthrow him by using exactly the same principle. 
So, to conclude Johnstone, the force of Aristotle’s criticism derives 
from the fact that Aristotle uses Eudoxus’ seriousness to undercut the 
very thing about which he is serious — he shows that Eudoxus has 
defeated his own purpose.
Aristotle’s criticism of Eudoxus’ argument is itself, of course, the 
argument. It is, in fact, an argumentum ad hominem, since it attacks 
Eudoxus in terms of his own principles. For the moment, it seems to 
be important to make the point that it would not be a rash to charac­
terize Aristotle’s argument, involving maximum force and exact rele­
vance, as valid; but it would be, at least, misleading to call it formally 
valid. Aristotle does not attack Eudoxus’ conclusion; he attacks only 
his way of reaching a conclusion. In other words, Aristotle does not 
seem interested in the validity of Eudoxus’ argument. Instead of at­
tacking his argument in general, he uses Eudoxus’ argument to attack 
Eudoxus.
Aristotle’s argumentation is addressed ad hominem. In spite of the 
common opinion, J ohnstone claims that there is no reason to suppose 
that an argumentum ad hominem must necessarily be invalid. He 
defines: “[...] argumentum ad hominem, like any other argument, will 
be valid when it establishes the conclusion it claims to establish, and 
invalid when it establishes a conclusion independent of this” .20
Now it seems to be clear why there is no argumentum ad rem in 
philosophy. Let us notice, if the truth or falsity of any philosophical
20 H.W. J o h n s t o n e ,  Jr.: Philosophy and Argument..., p. 73.
Henry Johnstone's Theory of Philosophical Argumentation. 21
statement is relative to the argument that establishes or disestabli­
shes it, then it is not relative to objective facts. Hence, there is no 
argumentum ad rem to establish or disestablish any philosophical 
statement. And, in the light of absence of any valid argumentum ad 
rem, we must suppose that all philosophical polemic is, in essence, 
addressed ad hominem. “And, in fact, the one common feature and 
peculiar to effective argumentation in philosophy is that it takes 
seriously the point of view it sets out to overthrow.”21
21 Idem: “Philosophy and argumentum ad hominem...", p. 497.
